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THE "PASSED MASTER"-HOW TO FILL THE VOID
CORNELIUS J. HARRINGTON* AND NATHAN M. COHENt
HIEF JUDGE JOHN BOYLE

has been acclaimed by judges, lawyers

and law professors-in fact, by all who have followed the reorganization of the courts in Cook County-for having placed
in operation, virtually overnight, a smooth, efficient, effective, unified
court system. Due to his tremendous energy and determination, the
quality and quantity of justice have improved vastly. But the population of the county and, therefore, the workload of its judicial system
continues to burgeon.
The presiding Judge of the Law-Jury Division, Judge Harold
Ward, has established a system which, under his remarkable guidance
and control, brings into constant operation the trial and disposition of
Law-Jury cases. His vigilance and zeal make it a common occurrence
for lawyers and judges to be assigned to the trial of a case within ten
minutes after reporting the disposition of another. Despite this extraordinary operation, it is eminently clear that the growth of population
and the increase in the number of motor vehicles in the County of
Cook has kept pace with the numerous judicial officers assigned to try
Law-Jury cases.'
* JUDGE HARRINGTON is PresidingJudge of the Chancery Division of the Circuit Court
of Cook County. He received his LL.B. in 1920 and his LL.M. in 1921 from De Paul
University and has been a member of the Illinois Bar since 1921. After serving as a
Master in Chancery of the Superior Court of Cook County from 1924 to 1934, JUDGE
14ARRINGTON was elected Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County and has been
reelected ever since. He has served as Chief Justice of the Circuit Court and Criminal
Court of Cook County. He is a trustee of De Paul University.

t JUDGE COHEN is a judge in the Circuit Court of Cook County, having been electcd
to the bench in November, 1962. He received his LL.B. from Northwestern University
in 1938 and is a member of the Illinois Bar. He has served in the office of the General
Counsel of the S.E.C. and the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. He was also an
Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. JUDGE COHEN
was a Master in Chancery of the Circuit Court from 195S until 1962.

1Cook County Population, April, 1962-5,223,000, April, 1966-5,414,000 (Research
and Statitsics Div.-Chicago Ass'n of Comm. & Ind.); Total Law-Jury Filings, 196212,744, 1966-16,379 (Office of the Deputy Court Administrator for Cook County);
Law-Jury Cases Pending, Dec. 31, 1962-46,265, Dec. 31, 1966-49,259 (Office of the
Deputy Court Administrator for Cook County); Motor Vehicles Estimated for 1971:
more than 100,000,000 for the United States, more than a trillion vehicle miles will be
traveled. (U.S. Bureau of Public Roads-See report on court and jury room facilities,
Judge Cornelius J. Harrington, 1960 Annual Report of the Illinois Judicial Conference
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One observer puts the problem into focus thusly:
That a problem might arise from the loss of the services provided by masters
in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function was not entirely unanticipated;
but it was also anticipated that the additional judicial man hours generated
by other innovations under the new Article would more than compensate for
such loss. Ultimately this may be true. In Cook County, however, the basic
purpose of those members of the Chicago Bar Association who worked on
the provisions of the Judicial Article was to reduce the backlog of pending
common law cases (primarily personal injury cases). Consequently, to accomplish this purpose Chief Judge Boyle has assigned most of the additional judges
in the county to hear common law cases and reduce this backlog. As a result
he has been able to assign only one additional judge to hear chancery matters.
In time, if the backlog of common law cases is essentially eliminated, additional
judges can be assigned to the Chancery Division, but for the time being such
assignments would defeat the primary purpose of eliminating the common
law backlog. Therefore, unless some way is found to expedite the hearing of
chancery cases it appears that instead of having delayed hearings in common
2
law cases the delay will simply be transferred to equity cases.

However, the undeniable continued increase in the number of law
cases filed each year presents a continuing challenge to Chief Judge
Boyle and the trial judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County who
are determined to shrink the time span between filing and trial dates.'
Prior to the adoption of the amendment to the Illinois Constitution
creating the new Judicial Article,4 much was written and said, pro and
con, 5 regarding the abolition of the masters in chancery from the judicial system. The most erudite expression on the wisdom, or lack thereof, of this constitutional prohibition is to be found in an article by
Justice James R. Bryant, of the Appellate Court of Illinois.' Justice
Bryant's plea to preserve the master system was scholarly, practical,
articulate and futile.
Executive Committee). It is patent that the population, filing and motor vehicle and
travel figures portend a continued increase in numbers and, by arithmetical progression,
an increase in rate of additional law-jury trials pending in the Circuit Court of Cook
County. Despite these factors, Judge Boyle is able to point with pride to a reduction in
the time lag between filing and trial dates.
2 Sulzbacher, The Missing Link-Masters in Chancery, THE GUARANTOR, LAWYERS'
SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1966, p. 4 (Published by Chicago Title and Trust Company).
3 Supra note 1. This figure confronts us after the addition of 17 judges in November,
1962; and the availability of nine additional trial court judges formerly assigned to
the Appellate Division, who were assigned to law-jury by virtue of the provision in
the Judicial Article providing for the election of Appellate Court judges. Thus, 26
trial court judges have been added since 1962.
4 ILL. CONsT. art. VI (1962).
5 ILL. CONST. art. VI (Smith-Hurd 7-11, 1964).
6 Bryant, The Office of Master in Chancery-Development and Use in Illinois, 49
Nw. U. L. REv. 458 (1954).
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THE INSTITUTION OF MASTER-IN-CHANCERY

IS A VENERABLE ONE

In abolishing the masters, Illinois ended an institution which may be
said to have had its origins prior to the inception of the chancery as a
court treating only with matters of equity. The Office of Lord Chancellor is traceable to the Saxon kings. The Chancellor and his several
clerks generally were men of the church, literate, a rarity in those
days, whose duty it was to record and maintain various records of the
kingdom and who were assigned the responsibility for transcribing,
sealing and publishing ordinances of the king.
At about the advent of William the Conqueror, 1066, these clerks
had been constituted into a body of twelve "Masters of Chancery."
The chief of this group was titled the "Master of the Rolls." The
masters were primarily responsible for drafting writs necessary for
suit in the king's courts, and for attaching the great seal of the king
after they determined that the writs were in proper form. This group
of learned men also served as legal advisors to the Chancellor and the
king and transcribed the proceedings in Parliament. With the growth
and expansion of the population and wealth of the kingdom, the business of the courts mushroomed. It became necessary, therefore, in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries for the Chancellor to develop a
larger staff of clerks who drafted writs of course. The original twelve
masters remained as supervisors who drafted new forms of writs and
continued to advise the Lord Chancellor when he sat as a judge. It is
evident that the clerks and masters stimulated the growth of the
chancery as a court of equity.
From the earliest Saxon times the king represented the source of all
law and often sat as a judge, advised by his council. The writs, which
eventually issued to the common law courts, were deemed only a delegation of the king's legal power; thus, all fields of justice not covered
by writs were deemed to reside in the king. It accordingly developed
that petitions in matters for which the common law had no writ or no
remedy were sent directly to the king and his council. The most frequent cause for appealing to the king appears to have arisen when one
of the parties to the suit was too powerful for a common law juror to
dare find against him. Therefore, as the number of these petitions to
the king grew, the only member of the king's council equipped to deal
with such a volume of petitions was the Chancellor because of his staff

of clerks and masters. Consequently, most petitions to the king were
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turned over to the Chancellor for investigation and recommendation.
The final decision, however, for many years continued to be the decision of the king and the council.
It is not clear what factors accounted for the tremendous growth of
chancery as a court. The Chancellor was not only the keeper of the
king's conscience, but he and his masters were generally ecclesiastics.
In this activity of dispensing justice the Chancellor commanded a comparatively large manpower force by the end of the 13th century and
by 1348 all petitions to the "King's Grace" were first to be presented
to the Chancellor. Under this procedure, minor judicial matters were
disposed of directly by the Chancellor and only matters which the
Chancellor felt were of sufficient import were brought to the attention
of the king. The masters were truly "coming into their own." These
were their days of greatest glory. "In 1402 a petition by the Commons
gives a list of ecclesiastics, in which Masters of the Chancery are placed
in order of precedence next before the Chancellor and Barons of the
Exchequer. Their robes were yellow or mustard-coloured and the
masters were provided with two a year, one trimmed with fur for the
winter and one with taffeta for the summer. They were also provided
with twelve tuns of wine a year by the king's butler and many other
emoluments, including a barge on the Thames for travelling on official
'7
business.
Throughout the 15th century the chancery became more and more
established as a court separate and apart from the king's council; bills
in chancery were, however, still addressed to the conscience of the
king. In the 16th century, the chancery apparently began to concern
itself more with the procedural and technical injustices of the common
law than with the inequities inherent in the imbalance of power between parties to a suit, and by the middle of the 16th century it was
commonplace for the Chancellor to refer cases to his masters for investigation, hearing and recommendation. This practice was necessary in
view of the fact that the Chancellor was, strictly speaking, a one judge
court until the appointment of the Vice Chancellor in 1813 and the
authorization of the Master of the Rolls to sit as a regular judge in
1833. Until the reign of Edward IV (1461-93), masters were appointed by the king, not the Chancellor. In 1833, the crown again
recalled the power of appointment from the Chancellor and thereafter
7

Ball, The Chancery Master, 77 L.Q. REV., 331,333-35 (1961).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

masters were selected by the crown and salaried, abolishing the fee
system in England.8
The first evidence of a court of chancery being clearly established
in the territory embraced in what is now the State of Illinois is found
in an act passed by the General Assembly in Indiana in 1805 which
provided for the organization of a court "to exercise all the powers and
authority usually exercised by the courts of chancery."'
A few years later, in 1812, a legislature was elected for the Territory
of Illinois, which had been separated from the Territory of Indiana by
an act of Congress, which became effective March 1, 1809. The 1812
legislature for the Illinois Territory enacted a law vesting judges of the
General Court with the following power, "They are hereby authorized to exercise all of the powers and authority usually vested in and
exercised by a court of chancery which said court shall be called and
styled The Court of Chancery."
The Congress of the United States in 1815 gave jurisdiction in
chancery to the judges of the United States for the Territory of Illinois.
It is clear, therefore, that chancery jurisdiction was established at both
the federal and territorial levels in Illinois several years in advance of
the admission of Illinois to the Union as a state on April 18, 1818.
In 1827 a revised code of Illinois embodied "An act to prescribe the
mode of proceeding in chancery" which provided for the assignment
of a commissioner to aid the court of chancery. His powers were to
execute a deed under order of the court.
In 1835, the legislature passed its first act designating Masters in
Chancery1" and providing for the court to set the masters' fees." The
Master in Chancery Act, which was repealed by adoption of the new
Judicial Article, was enacted in 1872;12 thus, the same statutory powers
and duties governed the master in chancery system for forty-two
years. The long-lasting dispute, more theoretical than real, as to
whether a master is a purely ministerial officer or a judicial one, was
8 For historical background of Masters in Chancery see:

CARTER,

A HISTORY

OF

ENGLISH LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1902); PLUCKETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW (1956); HENDERSON, CHANCERY PRACTICE (1904); HOFFMAN, THE OFFICE AND
DUTIES OF MASTER IN CHANCERY (1904).

9 Supra note 6, at 2. All historical data relating to Masters in Illinois contained in this
article is gleaned from Justice Bryant's article.
10 REVISED CODE OF LAWS, ILL. 94 (1827).
11111. Sess. Laws 32 (1835).
12 111. Sess. Laws 562 (1871).
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laid to rest in Ellwood v. Walter," which held that the master acts in a
dual capacity and that he may be considered a ministerial officer in the
sense that he makes no final determination of a judicial matter but that
he is an arm of the court and may also exercise such powers as a court
of equity may confer upon him subject, however, to review by the
court.
A PROMISE, NOT A PLAN

Prior to the adoption of the new Judicial Article, one advocate of
ending the master system said: "Mere abolition should produce a degree of clarity that is presently lacking. It is anomalous to say the
least, to have a judicial officer whose status is so uncertain and whose
duties are so varied. ' 14 The author promised that
The demise of the master, however, does not mean that the services he performed will be left undone. The proposed judicial article provides the court
of original jurisdiction with four classes of officers, namely: clerks, magistrates,
associate judges and circuit judges. It may be anticipated that those functions
of the master in chancery which are worth retaining can be appropriately
divided among these officers .... With respect to what is probably the masters
most important function, that of taking testimony and reporting his conclusions thereon, it may be assumed that the judges and associate judges of the
circuit court will be competent to fill the void created by the demise of the
master. 15

The author goes on to observe that, "Empirically, it seems sounder that
the person with the responsibility for decision on the trial level shall
have heard all of the evidence rather than attempt to derive his decision
from a cold record and someone else's conclusions."'16
What measures were adopted by way of implementation to fill the
void? Did such measures provide, or deny, the means to fill the void?
The new Judicial Article provides for the establishment of judicial circuits." Section 8 consists of three full paragraphs defining the judicial
circuits, the number of judges, associate judges and magistrates for
each circuit, the number of associate judges in the City of Chicago, the
number of associate judges in Cook County outside of the city and the
method of selecting the Chief Judge in each circuit. The last sentence
of the second paragraph tersely reads: "There shall be no masters in
chancery or other fee officers in the judicial system."
The "Schedule" providing for the transition from the Judicial
1a

103 Ill. App. 219 (1902).

14 Marshall, Judicial Reform and the Master in Chancery, 40 CHI. B. REc. 27 (Oct.
1958).
15 Id. at 27-28.
16 Id. at 28.
17 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (1962).
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Article of the Constitution of 1870 to the new Judicial Article provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 8 of this Article, masters in chancery and referees in office in any court on the effective date of this Article
shall be continued as masters in chancery or referees, respectively, until the
expiration of their terms, and may thereafter by order of court, wherever
18
justice requires, conclude matters in which testimony has been received.

The General Assembly repealed sections 38 and 38b of Chapter 53,

which formerly provided for fees of Masters in Chancery, all of Chapters 90 and 117 which related generally to Masters in Chancery and
referees, and section 24 of Chapter 116, which related to special commissioners who were fee officers.
The Article and the Schedule became effective January 1, 1964.
Section 627 of Chapter 37, Illinois Statutes (1963), provides:
Nothing herein contained shall authorize the delegation or assignment to
magistrates or others of the function heretofore exercised by masters in chancery or referees, or special commissioners of taking testimony for the purpose
of making or reporting findings of fact or of law to a judge for adjudication.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court, recognizing the purpose to
use magistrates to perform at least some of the functions heretofore
performed by the masters, provided that the Chief Judge or any judge
designated by him may assign to magistrates who are attorneys at law
the following duties formerly performed by masters:
(a) To hold and approve sales of property ordered by the court, regardless
of the amount involved, and to execute all proper documents in connection
therewith. (b) To hear and decide petitions to sell or mortgage interests in real
estate to pay debts in decedent's estates and petitions to sell or mortgage interests in real estate in conservatorsbipsand guardianships.19

These provisions have not and cannot fill the void.
PROGNOSTICATIONS AND PROBLEMS

Judge Cornelius J. Harrington, in an address to the Chicago Bar
Association, called attention to a meeting he had attended with the
then Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, Ray Klingbiel, Chief
Judge John S. Boyle and Judge Harold Ward. Following that meeting
the Chief Justice wrote:
The first suggestion contemplated that equity cases be referred to magistrates to hear and report the evidence to a judge of the Circuit Court. After
serious consideration, our court has decided not to adopt such a rule. In our
18 ILL. CONST. art.

VI, § 8 (Schedule).

19 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 295.
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opinion, the Judicial Article of the Constitution contemplates that with respect to those matters which are within his jurisdiction, a magistrate is to have
the authority and power of a judge, and his determinations are reviewable
only by the Supreme and Appellate courts.
If, as you anticipate, the volumne of equity cases cannot be handled by the
five judges presently assigned to that work, we would suggest that additional
judges of the circuit court be assigned to that work as promptly as possible. 20

However, when the hue and cry was raised for additional judges,
the demand was virtually entirely concerned with the backlog of per21
sonal injury cases rather than chancery litigation.
Many of the advocates for adoption of the judicial amendment
exulted in the thought that the backlog would be diminished by the
elimination of the masters. It was argued that:
The replacement of part-time non-adjudicatory personnel by full-time judges
will expedite the disposition of chancery cases. An inherent flaw in the system
of masters is that the original decision having adjudicative effect must be made
by one who has not heard the evidence. There is an unnecessary duplication
of function in the report of the master and decree of the court and too often
excessive expense to the litigant. The part-time nature of a master's services
and his lack of judicial authority also combine to cause undue delay. Surely,
any innovation designed to eliminate these undesirable features merits sympathetic consideration.
Moreover, the loss of manpower that will result from the abolition of masters
in chancery will be more than compensated by the unification of the court
system under the proposed Article and the provisions making possible a more
efficient utilization of judicial personnel. The General Assembly will have
flexible authority to provide for an adequate number of circuit and associate
22
judges to man the trial courts.

Other advocates of the Judicial Amendment applauded the provisions which abolished fee offices. They argued that, "Today there is no
place for the fee system in our state court structure and the proposed
amendment will cure the well recognized abuses of the fee offices." '23
In reply it was argued that the abolition of Masters in Chancery "will
increase the backlog by virtue of the fact that the taking of such evidence, which is now done by the 56 masters, will be an additional
workload falling upon the trial judges ...

the Cook County backlog

20 Letter from Chief Justice Raymond Klingbiel to Chief Judge John S. Boyle,
December 29, 1965.
21 Lavery and Cook, The Need for Judges Now, 42 CHI. B. REC. 212 (1961).
22 Kohn and Brizius, The ProposedJudicial Article of 1961-Reply to Objections, 42
CHI. B. REc. 269, 675 (1961).
23 The Proposed Judicial Amendment, 46 ILL. B. J. 9 (1957).
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can be reduced only by an increase in judges and courtrooms and not
'
by the abolition of Masters in Chancery. 24
The layman's reaction to the abolition of the masters is reflected in
an editorial broadcast by the general manager of radio station WIND,
who stated that:
As we hear it, with abolishment of the office of Master in Chancery last December 7th, the task of breaking the logjam becomes more difficult. Masters
in Chancery took the pressure off judges by hearing testimony in long and
complicated cases, and they made recommendations to the judges. Now, five
judges assigned to the Chancery Division are charged with hearing voluminous testimony themselves thus putting even more demands on their limited
Fulltime court commissioners, it seems to us, are sadly needed as a
time ....

major step forward in overcoming the major shortcoming of the new judiciary under the new amendment. 25
A recent Supreme Court decision, Centennial Laundry Co. v.
West Side Organization," holds that the discretion of the Chancellor
in determining whether an interlocutory order shall be granted does
not extend to the granting of an injunction without a hearing in cases
where all the material allegations have been put in issue by an answer
and the necessity of immediate relief is not apparent. The result of this
sweeping delimitation of the Chancellor's discretion has resulted in an
immediate response to notice of a complaint for injunction in the form
of an answer traversing all of the material allegations of the complaint. A hearing is therefore required in every case before temporary
relief is granted even where notice is given and bond is offered since
dispensing with notice is generally frowned upon.17 Consequently, the
answer in prompt response to the notice results in a hearing on the
material allegations of the complaint and the court must, in effect, proceed to a trial on the merits. The resulting burden upon the Chancellors is monstrous. The abolition of the masters and the present implementing statutory provisions require that the five Chancellors hear all
24 Fins, Ten Objections to the Proposed Illinois Judicial Article of 1961, 42 Cm. B.
REC. 261, 266-67 (1961).

25 Radio broadcast by Edward Wallace, Polish the Diamond-the New Judicial System, WIND Radio, Jan. 24, 1966.
26 34 Ill. 2d 257, affirming 55 111. App. 2d 406, 204 N.E.2d 589 (1965).
27 Berenson v. Berenson, 34 Ill. App. 2d 376, 379, 181 N.E.2d 357 (1962); Schaefer v.
Stephens-Adamson Mfg. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 310, 314, 183 N.E.2d 575 (1962); Seay &
Thomas, Inc. v. Kerr's, Inc., 58 111.App. 2d 391, 400, 208 N.E.2d 22 (1965); O'Brien v.
Matual, 14 Ill. App. 2d 173, 188, 144 N.E.2d 446 (1957); American Dixie Shops, Inc. v.
Springfield Lords, 8 111.App. 2d 129, 140, 130 N.E.2d 532 (1955); Stenzel v. Yates, 342
Ill. App. 435, 441, 96 N.E.2d 813 (1951); Clayton v. Hubbard, 33 111. App. 2d 439, 442,
211 N.E.2d 708 (1962); Parish v. Vance, 110 Il1.App. 50, 55 (1903).
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such trials. All of these matters are alleged to be of an emergency
nature; many of them are.
MAGISTRATES CANNOT FILL THE VOID

The efforts to offer solutions to the problem of the equity backlog
explosion resulting from the abolition of the office of Master in
Chancery include a suggestion that a magistrate could take the evidence, rule on objections and report to the Chancellor the controverted
issues of fact which in his judgment are determinative of the case.
Counsel, of course, would be given an opportunity to file objections to
the magistrate's report and argue that the magistrate erred in considering certain controverted issues as being controlling, or erred in
failing to include certain other issues that in the opinion of counsel
should be considered by the court. After argument on the magistrate's
report and any objections filed, the Chancellor, either at the request of
counsel or in his own discretion could require that certain testimony
be again presented before him if he concluded that this was necessary
or desirable before entering the final judgment or decree. 8
This suggestion overlooks Section 627 of Chapter 37 which provides, "Nothing herein contained shall authorize the delegation or appointment to Magistrates or others of the function heretofore exercised by Masters in Chancery or referees, or special commissioners of
taking testimony for the purpose of making or reporting findings of
fact or of law to the judge for adjudication." It is certain that such a
procedure would not be countenanced by our Supreme Court!
The several thousand pages of correspondence, drafts, memoranda
and minutes comprising the files of the Joint Committee of the Illinois
and Chicago Bar Associations on Implementation of Judicial Amendment reveal a number of interesting facts. The committee file contains
a reference to limitation upon the matters assignable to magistrates.
"Magistrates Legislation Number 4'29 concerning the authorization
to empower the Supreme Court to make rules covering pleading, practice and procedure for the Circuit, Appeals and Supreme Courts was
the subject of much discussion among committee members who
apparently thought the delegation to the Supreme Court was too broad.
Judge John Fitzgerald, formerly dean of the Loyola University School
of Law and then Deputy Administrator for the Supreme Court of Illi2SSupra
note 2.
29 JOINT COMMIrTEE OF THE ILL. & CHI.B. AssN's. ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL
AMENDMENT, MINUTES, REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS,

499 et seq. (1962).
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nois for Cook County, apparently led the discussion and expressed
concern that the provisions of Section 6 of the draft of April 20, 1963,
of the Magistrates Bill relating to delegation to the Supreme Court
might give rise to reinstatement of the master in chancery system. On
motion of the committee, unanimously approved, Section 7 was added
to Magistrates Bill Number 3.3

Section 7 of the act limiting or defining the matters to be assigned
to magistrates which prohibits the "delegation or assignment to magistrates or others" of the master's, referee's or special commissioner's
former function of taking testimony and reporting findings of fact or
law was therefore found in the earliest draft of the bill. Moreover, it
appears that the committee had some doubt concerning the constitutionality of any attempt to have magistrates perform the function of
hearing evidence and reporting to a judge.3 '
With respect to the delimitation upon the matters assignable to
magistrates, the report of the Joint Magistrates Committee notes that
"With respect to those matters that Magistrates cannot hear, we have
attempted to exclude certain extraordinary remedies and other matters that are most vital to one's life and personal liberty. We feel that
these matters should be determined by a Judge."32
In a footnote, the committee explains: "We rejected the suggestion
that matters otherwise excluded could be heard by a Magistrate if the
matter were uncontested. We concluded that uncontested matters
often require greater judicial attention and experience, because the
parties by collusion may be seeking something that is unlawful or not
in the public interest.""
An early opponent of the Judicial Article and later a member of the
Joint Committee, Attorney Harry G. Fins, writes concerning the proposed statute defining matters to be assigned to magistrates:
(d) This proposed section is, in my opinion, unconstitutional. Section 8 of
the Judicial Article provides: 'There shall be no masters in chancery . . . in

the judicial system.' It does not say merely that the designation of Master in
Chancery shall not be employed. This means that the judicial officer who
sees and hears the witnesses and observes their demeanor is to render the final
decision. To permit references and to denominate the referees as 'magnistrates'
instead of 'masters in chancery' is a transparent circumvention
of the express
34
constitutional prohibition and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
30 Ibid.
31 Supra note 29, at 129.
32

Supra note 29, at 379;

JOINT MAGISTRATES COMmHTEE, REPORT,

supra note 32.
Letter from Harry G. Fins to Professor William Trumbull, Chairman Joint Magis-

33 JOINT MAGISTRATES COMMITTEE,

34

44 (1962).

trates Comm., Jan. 7, 1963.
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The suggestion that a reference may be made to a magistrate, a
salaried officer, to hear and decide certain Chancery matters is wholly
inconsistent with Section 627 of Chapter 37 which prohibits the assignment "to a Magistrate or others" of the function heretofore exercised
by Masters in Chancery. Thus an assignment of a chancery matter not
specifically authorized by statute would have the effect of giving the
magistrate an assignment of a greater responsibility that he is prohibited
from receiving by Section 627. Or is it that the framers of the new
Judicial Article and the authors of the implementation statutes were
determined that there be no procedure which would countenance any
form of hearing and report by a quasi-judicial, non-judicial or judicial
officer who does not make the decision at the trial or hearing level? If
this is the spirit and intent of the new Article and the implementation
statutes then anything short of an arbitration agreement would not
suffice to conform to the constitution and implementation statutes.
The sessions, correspondence and first drafts of legislation considered by the Joint Committee on Implementation Amendments shed
light on the attitude of the committee with respect to hearing evidence
and reporting findings and conclusions by some officer other than a

Chancellor. One must glean from a search of this material that the
committee was opposed to such a procedure. This attitude or intent is
reflected in the enactment of Section 627.
Many proposals have been submitted by judges, law professors and
leaders of the bar designed to "fill the void." We shall attempt to
analyze and criticize these proposals.
ARBITRATION

It should be noted that all non-judicial hearings were not abolished
by the legislature which adopted the Judicial Article; at the same session of the General Assembly our lawmakers adopted the Uniform
35
Arbitration Act.
It has been argued, therefore, that the Constitution and implementing statutes do not prohibit a reference per se. Since the Arbitration
Act provides for the payment of fees to an arbitrator, the parties by
agreement could employ an arbitrator and by agreement allot to him
the same power of recommendation formerly conferred upon a master
rather than the broader powers of final, binding decision provided in
the Arbitration Act. It may well be argued that the parties to the
arbitration agreement may thus agree to limit and define the scope and
35 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10 § 101 (1961) and following sections.
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power of the arbitrators. The parties, pursuant to the Arbitration Act,
may provide for the method of the appointment of the arbitrators;
whether their powers shall be exercised by a majority or by unanimous
action; the time, place and notice of hearing; the procedure to be employed and the continuance of the hearing in the event that any
arbitrator for any reason ceases to act during the course of the hearing.
The parties may also agree concerning venue, the form of the award,
the manner in which the parties shall be apprised of the award, the
time in which the award shall be made, and all expenses and fees not
including attorney's fees. In all instances where the parties have not
agreed relative to the foregoing matters the statute prescribes the procedure.
A recent report of the Chicago Bar Association Real Property Law
Committee includes the recommendation that a study be made of the
feasibility of employing arbitration procedure in resolving disputes
related to real property transactions. " In contested foreclosure and
partition matters, may not the arbitration procedure be employed to
supplant the former Masters in Chancery? It is doubtful if the Supreme
Court of our state will approve the use of the Uniform Arbitration Act
to resurrect Masters in Chancery, who would henceforth be known as
arbitrators.
THE AMICUS

One possible solution to the problem which suggests itself is the
appointment of an Amicus Curiae to perform the services heretofore
performed by the Master in Chancery. An Amicus Curiae may be ap37
pointed by the court to make an investigation and conduct hearings;
he is not a party to the action but is merely a friend of the court and
38
one whose sole function is to advise or make suggestions to the court.
Absent a stipulation of the parties, it is doubtful that the Amicus
Curiae could be compensated." It is patent that any matter involving
a litigant's individual rights may be made the subject of a stipulation
which is binding and enforceable unless unreasonable or against good
36

CBA,

REAL PROPERTY LAW COMMITTEE REPORT

(1966).
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People v. Goss, 10 Ill. 2d 533, 546, 141 N.E.2d 384 (1957). See also People v.
Howarth, 415 I11.499, 502, 114 N.E.2d 785 (1953); Anderson v. Macek, 350 111.135,
182 N.E. 745 (1932); People v. McDonnell, 377 I11.568, 37 N.E.2d 159 (1941).
33

Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1953).

39 For a general treatment of this subject see 3 C.J.S. Amicus Curiae § 4; Covey,
Aimicus Curiae: Friend of the Court, 9 DE PAUL L. REV. 30 (1959).
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morals or public policy,4" viz., parties may stipulate to set aside a
former order even though it is beyond the time allowed for appeal. 4
While a stipulation of fact is binding, a stipulation as to legal conclusions arising from the facts is inoperative. 42 Parties cannot confer
jurisdiction upon a court by stipulation.
It has been held that where the court referred a complaint and
answer in a divorce matter to an Amicus Curiae "to hear and report
his findings and recommendation for and as to final disposition and
judgement of matters involved herein" that "there is no warrant in
law which authorizes the court to appoint or refer the cause to an
Amicus Curiae. Divorce cases should be heard by the court. Nor do
the facts in the instant case warrant the appointment of a Special Commissioner.,44
In defining the role of the Amicus Curiae it may be helpful to point
out three things that he is not. He is not an agency or arm of the court;
he cannot perform the functions of the court. He is not a party and he
is not bound by the resulting judgment. Finally, he is not an intervenor or intervening party to the suit.45
The employment of the services of the Amicus Curiae is the exercise
of an inherent right of the court and the parties cannot successfully
object. 46 Neither the parties nor the intended Amicus have grounds for
appeal from a decision concerning the use of an Amicus' services since
this is a matter wholly within the discretion of the court. We are left,
therefore, with no provision for the payment of fees of the Amicus
whose services are sought by the court; moreover, it is clear that the
court may not compel parties who object to submit their evidence in
hearings held by an Amicus.
The parties could, however, stipulate to submit evidence in hearings
held by an Amicus and stipulate concerning payment of his compensation. They could further stipulate that the findings of fact by the
4

OPlano Foundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 356 111. 186, 190 N.E. 255 (1934);

People ex rel. Reinhart v. Herrin, 284 I1.368, 120 N.E. 274 (1918).
41

Goostree v. United States, 110 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1940).

People v. Levisen, 404 I11.
574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950); In re Fahnestocks Estate, 384
111.26, 50 N.E.2d 733 (1943); People v. Byrnes, 405 Ill. 103, 90 N.E.2d 217 (1950). See
42

also Boehmer v. Foval, 55 111. App. 71 (1893).
43 Wainer v. United States, 87 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1937).
44

Traistar v. Traistar, 306 IlL. App. 509, 29 N.E.2d 286 (1940).

45

See Covey, supra note 39, at 31.

46

Ibid.

47

Supra note 38.
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Amicus shall constitute the stipulation of facts by the parties. Whether
this procedure violates Section 627 of Chapter 3748 presents a thorny
question. Certainly, unless this section is repealed the Amicus could
not submit conclusions of law for the Chancellor to review. Another
heavy doubt is raised by the contention that such an Amicus would in
essence be "a fee officer in the judicial system" in contravention of
Section 8 of the Judicial Article.
It has been argued that Section 8 of the new Judicial Article is, in
essence, constitutional admonition against the establishment of a judicial process similar to the Master in Chancery function under different
nomenclature.49 The argument is made that the words "other fee officers" are not words of art subject to precise definition. The phrase,
therefore, raises doubts as to the status of guardians ad litem, trustees
for persons not in being and commissioners in partition. It is urged,
however, that the better view is that the phrase has reference to officers performing quasi-judicial functions. We agree with this interpretation and regret that the legislature has confounded the problem
by the passage of Section 627.
One observer noted that the Joint Committee of the Illinois State
and the Chicago Bar Associations on Implementation, which participated in the drafting of Sections 621 and following of Chapter 37 were
of the opinion that Section 628 applies to an improper assignment regardless of the section under which it is improper. "Therefore, any
wrong decision on the impropriety of an assignment to a Magistrate
would simply be error within the proceeding and not a jurisdictional
defect. Such a decision, therefore, should not be subject to collateral
attack." 50
It is our view, however, that an agreement between parties not to
object to such an assignment could lead to a practice of improper
assignments. Such a practice, though done in the interest of eliminating congestion from the court's calendar, would not long survive condemnation by our Supreme Court.
48 "Nothing herein contended shall authorize the delegation or assignment to Magistrates or others of the function originally exercised by masters in chancery or referees
or special commissioners of taking testimony for the purpose of making or reporting
findings of fact or of law to a judge for adjudication." (Emphasis added.)

49 Boorstein & Sulzbacher, The Effect of the New Judicial Article on Real Estate
Transactions, 54 ILL. B. J. 580 (1966).
501 d. at 594.
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INHERENT POWER

It has been suggested that the appointment of masters is an inherent
power of the chancery and not subject to legislative control. The leading case on the subject arises under the laws of Wisconsin which appears to be the first state to abolish Masters in Chancery by its Constitution. The Wisconsin Constitution of 1848 provides that "testimony
in causes in equity shall be taken in like manner as cases at law, and the
office of Master in Chancery is hereby prohibited."'"
Despite this constitutional inhibition, Wisconsin has a statute which
provides for reference to a referee or commissioner when involved or
lengthy matters of account are in issue.5 2 This has been rationalized on
the basis that even at law, under the common law, cases involving the
examination of a long account could be taken from a jury and referred
53
to an outside hearing officer.
The Oregon high court has held that a statute providing for references in specified cases without the consent of both parties is mandatory and exclusive and applies as well to suits in equity as to actions at
law.54 At the other side of the continent, we find the Maine high court
holding that although a reference of an appeal from a probate decree
was by consent and the action of the referee in sitting and deciding the
appeal was by stipulation, consent could not confer jurisdiction where
law had not initially given it.5"
It has been said that statutory provisions for compulsory reference
in equity cases may not as readily be termed exclusive as those providing for reference of actions at law because the constitutional guaranty
of the right to trial by jury ordinarily has no application to equity
cases. Furthermore, compulsory references to Masters in Chancery
have ancient precedent. In the Oregon case, 56 the court pointed out
that a judge under the ancient chancery practice might refer a case in
equity without the consent of the parties, provided he gave only
advisory effect to the master's findings. Reference of equitable causes
51 WIS. CONsT. art. 7 § 19.
52 Killingstad v. Meigs, 147 Wis. 511, 133 N.W. 632 (1911).

53 Ibid.
54 Tietzel v. Southwestern Construction Co., 43 N.M. 438, 94 P.2d 972 (1939).
55 Chaplin's Appeal, 131 Me. 187, 160 Atl. 27 (1932); Faxon v. Barney, 132 Me. 42, 165
At. 165 (1933).
56 Tietzel v. Southwestern Construction Co., supra note 54.
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pursuant to statutory authorization is ordinarily held to be governed
7
exclusively by such statutory provisions.1
The question of a reference without satutory sanction, either with
the consent of the parties or sua sponte and compulsory, does not
appear to have been treated by any opinion of the Appellate or Supreme Courts of Illinois.
The number of courts using language to the effect that equity has
an inherent power to refer cases is in a distinct minority. 8 Furthermore, there appear to be no decisions that equity has any inherent
power which cannot be delimited or eliminated by statute; the Wisconsin situation is anomalous. Moreover, in Illinois we are confronted
by (1) no statute authorizing a reference, such statutes having been
repealed;59 (2) a statutory inhibition against references;6" and, most
conclusively, (3) a constitutional prohibition.6
The advocates of the "inherent power" theory may find a ray of
hope in the following quotations:
The 'inherent powers' of a court are an unexpressed quantity and undefinable

term, and the courts have indulged in more or less loose explanations concerning
it. Undoubtedly, courts of justice possess powers which were not given by

legislation and which no legislation can take away. These are 'inherent powers'

resident in all courts of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from
legislation but from the nature and constitution of the tribunals themselves.6 2
The 'inherent powers' of a court are such as result from the very nature of its
organization and are essential to its existence and protection and to the due
administration of justice. It is fundamental that every court has inherent power
to do all things that are reasonably65necessary for the administration of justice
within the scope of its jurisdiction.
SALARIED HEARING OFFICERS

Salaried hearing officers working on a part-time basis would not
violate the constitutional inhibition against fee officers in the judicial
system. As reported by the Presiding Judge of the Chancery Division,
of the Circuit Court of Cook County, a large portion of the volume of
57 See Annot. 126 A.L.R. 314-19 (1940).

58 id. at 313.
59 ILL. REV. STAT. ch.

110,

§§ 2, 64(2); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1081, § 18-107;

IL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 101, § 2; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 1-346; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279; ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 120, §§ 375-403.
60 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, S 627 (1961).
61 ILL. CONST. art. VI, S 8.
62 State v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 75, 275 P.2d 887, 889 (1954).
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chancery litigation consists of complicated, bitterly contested allegations of breaches of fiduciary obligations, intra-corporate and partnership struggles, suits for accounting, specific performance and for
emergency relief. 64 The bulk of these cases involves persons who can
well afford a substantial filing fee as well as the cost of such litigation.
These costs should hardly be borne by taxpayers whose participation
in the commercial life of the community rarely, if ever, brings them
to court.65
If the biggest objection to masters is that the parties are required to
pay fees, then part-time salaried officials could be created by statutory
enactment and references could be made to them in the same manner
as heretofore made to Masters in Chancery. Payment could be made on
a per diem basis, subject to the requirement that proof of the per diem
service be proffered before the Chancellor certifies payment of the per
diem salary. The source of funds for such salaries could be derived
from an increased filing fee for all chancery matters and the payment
could be made through the same type of machinery established for
payment of part-time retired judges who are assigned cases pursuant
to Section 18 of the Judicial Article.66
THE PROBLEM IN PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE

The masters in the twilight of their existence averaged 10,000 hours
per year in hearing time or 2,000 court days, or ten full-time Chancellors working the full 200 court days per annum.6" These figures pose a
problem which can only be solved by providing for ten additional
64 Address to the Chicago Bar Association by Judge Cornelius J. Harrington, January 27, 1966.
65 Ibid.
66 "Any retired judge may, with his consent, be assigned by the Supreme Court to
judicial service and while so serving shall receive the compensation applicable to such
service in lieu of retirement benefits, if any."
67 As of December, 1966, there were 68 masters in the court system. The masters
were asked to report on their time spent in hearing, drafting reports, legal research,
conducting master's sales and upon the estimated number of hours spent by their
secretaries and other help during 1963, 1964 and 1965. The following was tabulated
from the information supplied by the masters:
Hours Spent in Hearing Time ..................
Hours Spent Drafting Reports .................
Hours Spent in Legal Research ................
Hours Spent Conducting Master's Sales ..........
Estimated No. of Hours Spent by
Secretary and/or Others .....................
Number of Reports Filed ......................
Number of Masters Reporting .................

Year
1963
8,885
5,934
2,361
1,307

Year
1964
10,771
8,131
2,997
1,574

Year
1965
10,175
7,721
2,987
1,275

10,292
1,140
51

16,054
1,537
55

12,489
1,294
46

Total
29,831
21,786
8,345
4,156
38,835
3,971

50
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Chancellors. These additional Chancellors may be assumed to be full
Circuit Court Judges at present salaries of $29,000.00 per year. This
increment in judicial personnel necessarily involves additional courtroom personnel, a clerk, a court bailiff, a personal bailiff and secretary,
adding an additional $18,000.00 per year plus the cost of providing
courtroom space and other physical facilities or imposing an additional
total cost to the taxpayers in excess of $500,000.00 per year. If this cost
is to be avoided, other means must be devised to fill the void.
As the Presiding Judge of the Chancery Division has said:
In a not uncommon type of 'family feud' over control of a corporation heard
by one of the former Chancellors and concluded within the last several months,
there was consumed in this single case in excess of 5,000 hours of hearing time
before the master and the court. Approximately 4,900 hours of this time was
consumed in hearings before the Chancellor. Other similar instances of Chancery cases taking up more than five years at five hours per day of court hearing time in total man-hour time of a Chancellor could be cited. In this instance,
the litigation endured, at the trial level, for more than eight years.
At the Chancellor's current salary, more than $150,000.00 would be allocated to
this single case, not to mention the aggregate salaries of the court clerk and
bailiff.68
THE FEDERAL VIEW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to
be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition
69
requires it.

In LaBuy v. Howes Leather,70 strong language was used by the
Supreme Court in condemnation of a reference to a master. The reference was made sua sponte over the objections of all of the parties who
then filed motions to vacate the reference. The matter involved eighty
seven plaintiffs against six defendants in one anti-trust action and the
other action involved six plaintiffs and six defendants. Both cases
charged violations of the Sherman and the Robinson-Patman Acts; the
litigation was of monstrous proportions. 71 The Supreme Court, nevertheless, upheld the writs of mandamus issued by the Court of Appeals
ordering Judge LaBuy to vacate the reference. 72 The Supreme Court
said:
68 Address by Judge Harrington, supra note 53.
71 Ibid.
69 FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (b).
72 Ibid.
70 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
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Under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals was justified in finding the
orders of reference were an abuse of the petitioner's power under Rule 53(b).
The orders amounted to little less than an abdication of the judicial function
depriving the parties of a trial before the court on the basic issues involved in
the litigation. The use of masters is 'to aid judges in the performance of specific
judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause, and not to displace
73
the court.'

The court conceded that the petitioner in the case at bar had referred only eleven cases to masters in the past six years but further
7
observed that "even a little cloud may bring a flood's downpour.''
After conceding further that there is heavy congestion of the court
calendar in many of the District Courts, the court stated: "But, be that
as it may, congestion in itself is not such an exceptional circumstance
as to warrant a reference to a master. ' 7r5 The abolitionists found the
majority opinion in the Howes case a source of devastating ammunition
in their efforts to eliminate the master.
Somewhat in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court's philosophy con-

cerning references is that of the American Bar Association's Section
of Judicial Administration:
That in law cases involving complicated fact issues, there well may be reference
to a special master or auditor in advance of a jury trial with the submission
of his report for consideration by the jury ....
In jury actions the findings
of the referee, special master or auditor should be made admissible as evidence
of the matters found and be read to the jury subject to the ruling of76the court
upon any objection in point of law which may be made to the report.
EULOGY

The significance of the Master in Chancery, or the Chancery Master
as he is titled in the British system of jurisprudence, is treated with
profound ponderings by an English observer, who remarks:
[Tihe Chancery Master or Clerk in Chancery, occupies, and has always occupied, a somewhat anomalous position in the English legal system. His roots
extend to the very beginnings of the centralized system of justice which he
helped form.
From his detached and yet central position, with his ancient but yet modern
office, a Chancery Master may perhaps be allowed to speculate a little as to the
course of the profession of the law in the future.
With present trends of morality . . . it would seem that Chancery's concern
with illegitimate infants is bound to increase unless the Probate, Divorce and
73 Supra note 70, at 256.

74 Supra note 70, at 258.

75 Supra note 70, at 259.

76 SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION
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68 (4th ed. 1961).
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Admiralty Division frees itself from the bonds of matrimony. Should the
increase become very great, may we not see a new department of Chancery,
possibly under a Master in Bastardy, under a politcr name, mainly concerned
77
with the welfare of the illegitimate?

The author indulges in a highly satirical speculation of man's future
and the role of chancery in that future. He concludes, in his caustic
satire, that only when society becomes a monolithic bureaucracy will
the work of the chancery be done and "survive as a strand of the
collective consciousness. "78
Has the Judicial Article catapulted the Illinois Master in Chancery
into a comparable place in history The demise of the Illinois Master
has left his judicial relatives with an abundance of problems. The
British reverence for the Chancery Master does not exist for his Illinois
counterpart, if indeed it ever did. Perhaps the legislature, again aided
by leaders of the bar and bench, will find a lead to a sound solution in
what has been said.
77 Supra note 7.

78

Id. at 357.

